The notion of analyticity, or the problem of analytic-synthetic distinction has played an important role in the development of twentieth century philosophy, including the development of analytic philosophy. Philosophers have focused intensely on this distinction, not only because it seems important for understanding knowledge in general but also because it seems crucial for understanding the task of philosophy. As a result, the analytic-synthetic distinction was at the heart of epistemological discussions and underlay the conception of philosophy as an autonomous body of knowledge. Yet analyticity has been largely neglected for the past few decades. Why? One reason may be that a common contemporary attitude toward analyticity stems from the belief that W. V. Quine, along with others such as N. Goodman and M. White, conclusively showed that there is no such thing as analytic statement, or that if there is such a thing, it is of no philosophical relevance. This paper aims at the preliminary work for understanding the reason why did Quine's attack of analytic-synthetic distinction influence on so many analytic philosophers for so long. So, it investigates origins and the development of notion of analyticity through many philosophical projects of the late modern and contemporary period, including the work of D. Hume, I. Kant, G. Frege, and the Vienna Circle. This paper attempts to highlight how individual philosopher's explanations of analyticity informed their view of the task of philosophy itself. In doing these, I believe that we can understand the reason why did Quine's attack of analytic- synthetic distinction influence on the work of analytic philosophers.